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Article 5

Effect of Agency Problems on RTC Hotel Appraisals
Abstract

Agency problems that helped cause the banking crisis in the United States in the 1980s impacted hotel
appraisals competed for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Lower appraised values would help make
more bids acceptable, helping to sell more assets quickly. The results indicate appraised hotel values were
much lower than sales prices in states with a high number of bank failures.
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Effect of agency problems
on RTC hotel appraisals
by Michael C. Dalbor

Agency problems that helped cause the
banking crisis m the United States in the
1980s impacted hotel appraaals completed
forlhe Resolut,on Just Co~poration(RJC).
Lower appra~sedvalues wwld help make
mwe bids acceptable, helping to sell more
assets quickly. The results indicafe
appraised hotel values were much lower
than sales ~ t h z sin states wrth a hiah
number of bank failures.

gency problems such as
moral hazard and regulatory
forbearance contributed to
the banking crises in the United
States in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Moral hazard can generally
be defined as agents taking actions
to the detnment of thcir employers.
In terms of the banking industry,
this cccumed as bank officials took
actions that were not in the best
interest of depositors. Regulatory
forbearance was the practice of
government regulators foregoing
disciplinary actions against troubled banks in the hope that the
banks would turn themselves
around. The problems with the

bankmg industry were so severe
that fie ~
~savings
d and ~L~~ ~
Insurance C O ~ O r a t i O n(FS1,TC)
went bankrupt and the Federal
I~~~~~~~~ corporation
losses in the
late 1980s.
Some of the major causes of the
crises were practices used by many
lenders at the time. In order for
borrowers to quality for a loan, an
appraisal had to be completed. This
led to a number of problems in the
loan process. For one, commercial
properties are often more specialized and complex than single-family
residences, requiring more specialized skills and training. However, at
the time, appraisers were designated by a wide variety of organizations that were not organized under
the auspices of state governments.
Therefore, the educational background and experience of these
appraisers varied significantly.
Another major factor in the
pmcess was the ability of borrowers
to hire appraisers directly. This
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politicians in Congress did not
particularly want to deal. First,
Congress passed legislation in 1980
that served to deregulate the
savings and loans industry in order
to help keep it competitive. Furthermore, this legislation increased
deposit insurance to $100,000 per
account, which created a large
moral hazard problem by allowing
savings and loans to use greater
amounts of brokered deposits.
By the time the RTC was
formed, the problem was enormous,
particularly in the southwestern
United States. The FDIC tracked
bank failures in the U.S. between
1980 and 1994. During this time,
RTC solves problems
This situation got out ofhand by 599 banks, or more than 29 percent
the late 1980s.An extreme example of total supply, failed in Texas alone.
was the case of a parcel of vacant Failures in other states were also
commercial land that was appraised high: 44 percent of banks in Alaska
a total of six times. The appraised failed along with 33 percent of
values began at $2 million and even- banks in Oklahoma. The total for
tually rose to $175 million on the the U.S. and Puerto Rico was 1,614,
same parcel. FSLIC later sold the or 9.1 percent of total supply,
property at auction for $2.5 million.' dwarfing the banking problems of
Congress linally began to deal with the Great Depression.'
For years before the formation
the problem of cleaning up the
banking mess though the Financial of the RTC, the costs of the cleanup
Institutions Reform, Recovery and were consistently underestimated.
Enforcement Act (FIRREA)of 1989. The problem was a large and
President Bush signed the bill that growing one that needed to be taken
included a wide variety of refonns care of in a timely manner in order
regarding the appraisal industry. A to ensure the solvency of the
major provision of the act was the banking system and have the
formation of the Resolution T n ~ s t smallest impact on the economy.
The nature of the problem was
Corporation (RTC), which was
given the daunting task of selling a rather embarrassing for politicians,
significant number of problem real who were seen as part of the
and financial assets of failed banks problem to begin with. Additionally,
in a timely manner.
many in Congress did not want to
The RTC was formed to help raise taxes during a period of worssolve a problem with which many ening economic conditions. Theremeant that the appraiser was
working directly for the borrowers,
who were primarily interested in
seeing values that would justify the
loans for their projects. While an
appraiser's compensation was not
based upon any particular value,
appraisers were not compensated
based upon accuracy either.
Appraisers were (and still are)
compensated at a flat rate.
However, appraisers who presented
values that were consistently too
low for borrowers to qualify for loans
were putting any future potential
business in jeopardy.
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quickly in order to meet the book
value reduction goals.'"
One of the major tools used by
RTC oificials in the auction process
was a recent appraisal of the property. Since the RTC was generally
not experienced in real estate
management or valuation, it relied
significantly upon experienced
appraisers to help assist in selecting
a winning bid on an asset. While
Asset sale is goal
Given the political sensitivity of recovery rates on book value were
the savings and loan cleanup and tracked and evaluated, removing
the limited funding of the RTC, one properties from the books was a
of the major goals of the RTC was major priority. Therefore, if a hotel
the cumulative sale of a s s e k 3 was appraised at a relatively high
These sales and the ratio of sales value, it would be possible that no
price to appraised value were bids could be accepted because they
reported to Congress by the GAO. were too far below the appraised
Although the RTC was also evalu- value. On the other hand, low
ated on the ratio of sales proceeds to appraised values would mean that
book value, the sales goal was the bids would be closer to the
significant. For example, the RTC's appraisals, perhaps even exceeding
sales goal in 1992 alone was them. This would make more bids
approximately $100 billion? This acceptable, helping to sell the assets
goal had an important effect on the faster. Moreover, it might make the
RTC appear to be more "efficient" by
operations of RTC officials.
Examples of the problems accepting bids above appraised
created by the book value reduction values.
goal were revealed in a GAO report
on RTC auctions held in the Wash- Policies are established
ingtonBaltimore area in 1992. The
At the end of 1992, the RTC
GAO concluded that the auctions issued a directive stating all of its
were not planned or managed auctions must be conducted in
correctly in order to maximize accordance with established policies
revenuesi Complete information and guidelines. By establishing poliwas not always supplied to bidders cies and procedures and by gainmg
and many times property infonna- experience over time, the situation
tion was inaccurate. It appears that at the RTC began to improve. By
the R E was overwhelmed and 1993, the end was in sight for the
unprepared for the task given to RTC because there were fewer propthem. As the GAO concluded, "inad- erties to sell. In May 1993 Congress
equacies occurred...because the passed the Resolution Trust Corpostaffwas motivated to get sales done ration Completion Act. This act
fore, the RTC was only intended to
be a temporary government agency
that would sell non-performing
assets and loans to various bidders.
Moreover, the government intended
to monitor the operations of the
RTC via
the
Government
Accounting Ofice (GAO) which
would make reports to Congress.

Dalbor

-

Contents © 2003 by FIU Hospitality Review.
The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other
material is expresslv prohibited without written permission
from the publisher, excepting thatone-time educational reproduction is allowed without express permission.

served to phase out the RTC beginning with a transition period in
April 1994. The RTC had worked
fast enough to allow Congress to
move up the complete termination
of the RTC from December 31,
1996, to December 31,1995. Given
the foregoing occurrences in 1993,
there was clearly less political
pressure to achieve book value
reduction goals than in 1991 or
1992. RTC commercial real estate
sales (not just hotels) totaled 7,031
between 1989 and 1993, with
5,814 occurring before 1993.7
Monitoring is ineffective
One of the major agency problems in the savings and loan crisis
was ineffective monitoring. This
was embodied in the policy engaged
in by federal regulators known as
regulatory forbearance. This is a
policy where insolvent banking
institutions were permitted to
continue operating in the hope that
conditions would improve enough
for them to recover. Additionally,
regulators feared that closing these
institutions would have too much of
a negative impact on the solvency of
the deposit insurance fund.
Research indicates that between
1980 and 1988, insolvent institutions remained open for an average
of approximately 17 months after
being declared insolvent. In one
case, a bank that was declared insolvent in 1979 was still operating in
1988.'
The policy of regulatory forbearance only served to delay dealing
with the problem. The delay helped
increase the magnitude of the

problem the RTC had to deal with
later. The increasing number of
insolvent institutions served to
deplete the deposit insurance more
rapidly and increased the need to
speed up the disposal of assets at
insolvent institutions. % in turn
led to the bookvalue reduction goals
previously discussed and the need
for appraisals that could help
accomplish that goal.
Given the evidence that
"aggressive" appraisals contributed
to the banking crisis of the 1980s,
the literature on appraisal accuracy
is surprisingly limited. Moreover,
only a modest amount of research
has focused on specific types of
commercial real estate such as
hotels. However, the appraisal accuracy literature generally supports
the notion that appraised values are
affected by the agency relationships
in the process and the motivations
of the parties involved.
Appraisal "accuracy" is generally measured as the difference
between the sales price and the
appraised value expressed as a
percentage of the sales price.
Accordingly, a negative difference
indicates the appraised value is
lower than the sales price. The
earliest research examined mean
absolute differences with only three
hotels in the sample." However, the
authors of this research recognized
that the sign of the difference is of
particular importance to real estate
investors and updated their findings. The research disclosed a wide
variety of differences across property types such as sales prices
exceeding appraised values by
FIU Hospitality Review /Spring 2003
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nearly 24 percent for apartments
and appraised values exceeding
sales prices for hotels by more than
5 percent.'O This indicated that
these differences could vary across
property types, region, and,
perhaps, different years.
The first study that looked at
signed differcnces over time
revealed changes in percentage
amounts across property types as
well as during different phases of
the real estate cycle. Sincc many of
the differences were statistically
different from zero, it is believed
that certain properties were easier
for appraisers to value than others."
Other real estate researchers
argued that agency relationships in
the appraisal process play a more
important role than specific property characteristics or flaws in
appraisal methodology."
Research was subsequently
completed involving hotels that
examined the agency relationships
involved in the process along with
economic circumstances and
hypothesized motivations of the
parties involved. Using differences
between sales prices and appraised
values, the findings revealed
changes in signs and percentages
across time. Additionally, the
research found that the time period
when the appraisal was completed
and the identity of the appraisal
client (either the RTC or institutional lenders such as banks) had
significant effects on the result^.'^
Existing literaturc has revealed
that differences between appraised
values and sales prices ofhotels will
change over time. The literature has

also lent support to the notion that
the agency relationships and the
motivations of the parties in the
appraisal process can have an
impact on appraised values. Accordingly, this research will examine the
values of hotels appraised for the
RTC to see if the results were
impacted by the goals and motivations of the RTC.
FDIC supplied data
The data for this study were
supplied by the FDIC. The data
included hotel appraised values and
sales prices from RTC auctions held
between 1989 and 1994. The variable of interest is the percentage
difference between the appraised
value and the sales price which is
calculated as (appraised value sales pricej/sales price. Therefore,
positive differences represent,
appraised values exceeding sales
prices while negative differences
refer to sales prices exceeding
appraised values. Sales prices were
adjusted to the date of appraisal
using the Col-nell Index, a hedonic
index based upon changes in key
factors aifecting hotel sales prices."
Statistics compiled by the FDIC
indicate a total of 1,617 FDICinsured bank failures in the United
States between 1980 and 1994, or
9.1 percent of total. High bank
failure states are considered to be
those in the upper quartile in terms
of percentage of banks that failed,
meaning a failure rate of approximately 12.5percent and above. The
states in this upper quartile
included Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of
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Columbia, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas,
and Wyoming. Hotels with sales
prices below $1 million were
excluded to avoid inclusion of time
share properties and partial interest.
The differences were subsequently
examined for n o d t y One outlier
was removed, leaving a total sample
of 124 hotel appraisals, including 40
from high bank failure states. A
breakdown of the samples by year is
shown in Table 1.
Given the need for the RTC to
dispose of non-performing assets
quickly, particularly in states with a
high number of bank failures, this
study hypothesizes that appraisals
in these states were lower than
appraised values. As discussed
earlier, lower appraised values
would make bids more readily
acceptable, meaning quicker sales
and helping the RTC meet its asset
reduction goals. The expectation is
that the mean differences for hotel
appraisals in the high bank failure

states are going to be significantly
less than in other states.
As previously discussed, legislation was enacted in 1993 that
dictated the eventual takeover of
the RTC by the FDIC and the
demise of the RTC altogether. By
this time, a significant number of
assets had been sold. Furthermore,
economic conditions in the hotel
industry were much improved as
compared to 1991, one of the worst
years for the U.S. lodging industry
since the 1970s. With less pressure
to sell properties quickly, this may
not have forced appraised values
lower as in the early years of RTC
operations. Therefore, the expectation is that mean difference for hotel
appraisals completed in 1993will be
higher than those before 1993.
The next step in the analysis is
to examine the explanatory power
of these factors in a regression
model, which will utilize variables
related to the factors previously
discussed, appraisals completed in

Table 1
RTC hotel appraisals by year
Year

Total sample

Hotels in high
bank failure states

Hotels in other

1989

3

1

2

1990

15

7

8

1991

38

12

26

1992

44

14

30

Note: The laDle s h o ~ slhe norel appra!sals dseo in lnc analys,s The brsr column rrsls the year, the
secondcolumn deranrs lhe number 0lapp.w sa,sm me ent~resanlple: me ln,rdcolumn11srsthe number
01 appm~salscomprcled n lhc hngn Dank lalllrre slales
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high bank failure states, and
appraisals completed in 1993 or
later. Additionally, a combination
variable will be added to the model
that represents those properties
appraised in high bank failure
states and in 1993 or later. This
last variable is created by multiplying the high bank failure variable by the 1993 variable. This
variable will also be tested for
significance as there still may have
been strong incentive to sell properties quickly in the high bank
failure states even after 1993.
Therefore, the full regression
model is as follows: % Diff =
Regression Intercept + High
Failure + 1993 + (High Failure and
1993) + Error Term. Variations of
this model will be examined to
assess which model is the best.
Results show differences

Differences between appraised
values and sales prices for hotels in

high bank failure states were
compared to other observations in
the sample using a t-test. Additionany, differences between appraised
values and sales prices for hotels
appraised in 1993 or later were also
compared to other observations
using the same test. The results are
shown in Table 2.
T-test results lend support to
the hypotheses. The mean difference in the high bank failure states
was negative and significantly
lower than the mean difference for
appraisals completed in other
states.Additionally,themean difference for appraisals completed in
1993 or later was positive and
significantly higher than the mean
difference for appraisals completed
in a prior period. Although the
difference between appraised
values and sales prices for all properties before 1993 was negative, the
difference is very small (only -.7
percent) and not significantly
different from zero.

Table 2
Two sample t-tests
Mean difference ol
appraisals related
lo factor of interest

Mean difference of
olher appraisals
in sample

Hntels in hioh bank failure states

-8.3"/0

9.0%

3.85'-'

Hotels appraised in 1993 or later

18.9%

-.7%

-2.41"

Factor 01 interest

T-test lor
signilicant
differences

Nole: Tne 1aDe dela!h lne r ~ s u
1s 01 1-IGSIS cor?dr~l+o
011 172 s3mp.e m e f r s r co.,mrr . s s me laclor
01 .nlcreir me srconc mlumn pro, ocs me mean perccrlaqe d8HcrencG ozhveen 8ppralseo ,due
and sales price for those appraisals described ,n the f i ~column.
l
The lhird column represents lhc
mean percenlage differences for other appraisals n the sample. The fourih column b l s the T-statistic
from the lest for significanl differences between the second and lhird mlumns.
.'Significanl at the .05 level.
"'Significant a1 the .01 level,
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The results of the five different
regression models are shown in
Table 3. All of the variables were
significant at a .05 level of significance or greater. The simple regression models with one independent
variable are significant, but have
only limited explanatory power.
However, the coefficient of the high
bank failure variable has a negative
sign as expected. This means that
appraised values of hotels in high
bank failure states were less than
sales prices. Conversely, the coefficient of the 1993variable has a positive sign, also as expected.
The best model includes all
three variables, including the interaction between high bank failure
and 1993. The coefficient of this
variable is significant and negative,
meaning that appraised values
were less than sales prices for those
hotels located in hlgh bank failure
states and appraised in 1993 or

later. This lends support to the
notion that the cleanup problem
was particularly severe in high
bank failure states and that the
RTC may have continued to influence appraised values downward in
those states even in 1993 and later.
The study hypothesized that the
agency problems of moral hazard
and regulatory forbearance that
contributed to the banking crisis
also had an impact on RTC operations. These problems may have led
RTC officials to influence hotel
appraised values downward in
states with a high number of bank
failures to make more bids acceptable and "get the assets off the
books" quickly. The results tend to
support this notion, with hotel
appraised values being significantly
less than market values in high
bank failure states, even after the
1993 legislation that established
guidelines and proposed the

Table 3
Regression results
Regression
model

Intercept

High failure

(1)

9.03"'

-17.36"'

121

-67

(5)

3.03

1993

High failure
and 1993

F'

19.54"'

-10.64"

25.21"'

-29.96"

Adjusted
R2

12.47"'

8.5%

11.94"'

8.2%

10.26"'

18.4%

Note: The table details ihe results olt-tests conducled on the samole. The first column lists the factor
of interest. The second column orovides the mean Dercentaoe d;~erencebetween
aooraisnd
~ - - vallx
~
-..
- . -~
and sales pnce lor those appralsals uescnbea m the hrsr column. The thlra corumn represents tne
mean percentage arnerences lor ofher appraisals m fnc sanlple. The fourth column rsrs are T.slabst,c
from the test for significant c3Herences between the second and miid columns

.

~

~~~

-~

~

~

~~

~~

"Significant af the .05level.
"'Signilicant at the .O1 level.
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takeover of RTC operations by the
FDIC.
Further research could be
completed regarding the interaction
between agency problems such as
moral hazard and r e g u l a t o ~
forbearance and economic circumstances regarding their impact on
appraised values of other types of
real estate. Further investigation
could also be conducted on how the
lack of readily available information
affects the hotel appraisal process.
Overall, it appears that further
research into agency relationships
in the process may bring forth some
interesting insights with respect to
appraisal accuracy.
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